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Summary:
Regulatory rate hearings reveal the three common approaches to estimating
equity capital costs, the comparable earnings method, the discounted cash flow
model, and the capital asset pricing model, coexist more as rival rather than
complementary techniques. This paper attempts to reconcile these three approaches
to public utility rate regulation.

TOWARDS A RECONCILIATION OF THE COMPARABLE
EARNINGS, DCF, AND CAPM APPROACHES TO
PUBLIC UTILITY RATE REGULATION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
Regulatory approved utility service prices are set to allow recovery
of costs, including interest, taxes and depreciation, plus a "just and
reasonable" rate of return on common equity investment. Legal precedents
define this "just and reasonable" return as a rate commensurate with the
rates available on alternative investments having comparable risks, and
sufficient to enable the utility to attract capital and to maintain its
financial integrity. Implementation of these legal standards has become
perhaps the most controversial issue in regulatory proceedings. The
problem is that the ambiguous law relating to rate of return determination
causes controversies over the appropriate estimating procedure.
This paper attempts to reconcile the rate of return estimates of the
three most widely used rate of return estimating procedures in regulatory
hearings, the comparable earnings (CE) method, the discounted cash flow
(DCF) model, and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The paper begins
with a brief review of the notion of a just and reasonable return and the
application of the three conventional rate of return estimating procedures.
The data and methods used to develop required return estimates for the CE,
DCF, and CAPM models are developed in the next section. An accounting beta
logic is used to select non-regulated firms with earnings comparable to util-
ities in an attempt to overcome the subjectivity traditionally associated with
the CE method. Empirical testing of the comparability of the required return
estimates generated by the three estimating procedures comprises the penulti-
mate section. Concluding comments appear in the last section.
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THE NOTION OF A JUST AND REASONABLE RETURN
There is little debate in practical circles about the broad purpose
of regulating public utilities' rates of return. Regulation by a public
body is to substitute for the competitive market mechanism in determining
the prices and services offered by profit orientated monopolies.
Utility regulation attempts to achieve the allocative efficiency that
would exist if utilities operated in a competitive market by fostering the
same marginal conditions that exist under a competitive environment [6, IdJ,
Commissions regulate electric utilities by approving service prices that
are expected to generate revenues sufficient to allox>? recovery of costs,
including interest, taxes, and depreciation, plus a fair return on equity
investment. The governing Igoic of what constitutes an appropriate rate
of return for regulators to approve is the Supreme Court's statement in
the Hope decision:
The return to the equity owner should be commensurate
with returns on investment in other enterprises having
corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be
sufficient to assure confidence in the financial in-
tegrity of the enterprise so as to maintain its credit
and to attract capital.
The first sentence establishes a "comparable earnings" standard, the
second, a "capital attraction" standard. iJut the language of the Hope
decision is sufficiently broad that alternative interpretations of these
standards exis t
.
Theory suggests that the "comparable earnings" standard for rate of
return regulation should be utilities' cost of capital [IbJ. A firm's
expected return on incremental investment in competitive equilibrium
theory is the firm's cost of capital. Should regulators allow utilities
to charge service prices that create expected returns on new investment
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equa.1 to investors required return, then the Hope decision's comparable
earnings and capital attraction standards would appear to be met.
In a competitive industry the market value of a firm is the capital-
ized earning value of its assets, or, stated alternatively, the cost of
constructing and operating comparable capacity at current factor prices.
Investment capital will flow into the industry as long as deniand is suf-
ficient to permit the marginal firm to earn a return equal to the cost
of capital. The marginal firm's book and market values tend to be equal
since the firm is constructed and operated at current factor prices and
earns a return just equal to the cost of capital. The intramarginal
firm may have positive net present value investment opportunities or
projects with returns on the equity investment portion (r) greater than
equity investors required return, ke. Such excess returns are economic
rents v;hich become capitalized in the market value of equity, and cause
capitalized or market value to exceed book value. Of course, the exis-
tence of economic rents does not effect the necessary marginal condition
(r = ke) for new capital to enter the industry.
Cost of capital orientated regulation can function to preserve for
the public, instead of the producer, the benefits of a natural monopoly
[8], Figure 1 depicts how regulation directed toward allowing an aver-
age rate of return on investment equal to a utility's cost of capital
could tend to eliminate economic rents, or investment returns greater
than the cost of capital, without depriving investors of a competitive
return. In terms of Figure 1, the unregulated firm will accept all in-
vestment projects offering an internal rate of return on the equity
financed portion, r, greater than or equal to the cost of equity capital.
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FIGURE 1
THE IMPACT OF REGULATION UPON A FIRM'S
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SCHEDULE (lOS)
FOR THE EQUITY FINANCED PORTION OF PROJECTS
% Return
r pre-regulation
' r regulated
lOS (Non-regulated
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ke. The average return on accepted projects, r, exceeds ke but the op-
2portunity cost for employment of equity capital remains ke.
Utility regulation can tend to eliminate returns greater than ke
by approving service prices that are expected to generate revenues only
sufficient to allow recovery of costs, including interest, taxes, and
depreciation, plus just a ke return on the equity financed portion of
the asset investment. As sho\.m in B'igure 1, this approach to regulation
can eliminate r > ke investments while leaving unchanged the marginal
conditions that determine the quantity of investment capital entering
the industry. Stated differently, under regulation r = r = ke, while
r > ke for the non-regulated firm in an industry with an upward sloping
supply curve.
Methods of Estimating the Cost of Equity Capital
At the present time there are three approaches to estimating the
cost of equity capital that frequently appear in rate of return hearings;
the comparable earnings (CE) method, the discounted cash flow (DCF) model,
and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) . Both the DCF and CAPM are
stock market equilibrium models and provide market estimates of investors'
expectations regarding the marginal return on new investment in an in-
3dustry. The CE approach is the most widely used method, but it is
based upon observed average book rates of return on past investments of
firms judged to have comparable risk.
The DCF method suggests the cost of equity capital, ke, can be ex-
pressed as
ke = D^/P^ + g CD
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where D, is the dividends per share in the next period, P is the current
1 o
price per share of stock, and g is the expected growth rate in dividends
per share, ke measures the rate of return investors anticipate when they
purchase shares in firms with specific expected earnings and risk char-
acteristics. It is a market rate of return defined in terms of antici-
pated dividends and capital gains relative to stock prices.
The other stock market equilibriiun model is the CAPM which expresses
the expected holding period rate of return on equity for company j (Rj)
as
E(Rj) = R^ + 6. E(Rm-Rj) (2)
where R_ is the risk free rate, ECRm-R^) is the expected holding period
risk premium on the market, g, is the measure of systematic risk for
company j, and the tildes denote random variables. The CAPM posits an
asset's excess return is directly proportional to its a or systematic
risk. Moreover, it is clear that an asset's return will contain no
premium for unsystematic risk since portfolio diversification can elim-
inate unsystematic risk.
E(R.) is a risk adjusted estimate of investors required or expected
return. Assuming the stock market is in equilibrium, then E(R-) should
equal ke
•
, since both models attempt to measure the required return ex-
pectations of equity investors. E(R.) and ke^ are also estimates of the
marginal return on new investment in a competitive unregulated industry.
Stockholders in a regulated public utility can hold their shares, or
sell their shares and either purchase shares or undertake direct invest-
ment in unregulated industries of equal or comparable risks. In market
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equilibrium, the yield on investments of comparable risk will be equal.
Accordingly, required return on public utility stocks as measured by
E(R. ) and ke. is an estimate of the required equilibrium return on shares
of comparable risk, unregulated firms in a competitive industry, as well
as an estimate of the returns available on new investment in unregulated
firms of corresponding risks. Thus, a E(R.) or ke. estimated required
return provides not only the same marginal conditions that exist under
conditions of competition, but also provides a yield that would appear
to meet the Hope decision's comparable earnings and capital attraction
standards [8].
The CE method of estimating a just and reasonable return generally
consists of examining the profitability of a sample of other public
utilities and/or unregulated firms purported to be comparable in risk
to the firm under regulatory review. The mean accounting return on com-
mon equity capital for the set of comparable firms, R , is taken under
this approach to be a measure of the cost of equity capital. To advance
R as a measure of required return is to argue that a utility should
be allowed to earn in the future what it would have earned on the average
in the past had its capital been invested in other firms of comparable
risk [18, p. 62].
The CE method does not compare favorably with the DCF and CAPM ap-
proaches to estimating equity capital cost. First, the DCF and CAPM
methods handle risk automatically while risk must be treated explicitly
when using the CE approach. It is difficult in practice to identify a
suitable set of firms with corresponding risks. Transcripts of rate reg-
ulatory hearings reveal risk assessment and the selection of comparable
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risk firms is highly subjective. Further, CE proponents have not pro-
gressed in the direction of evolving a theory about the relationship of
risk and book rates of return.
Second, there is the question of whether accounting rates of return
accurately proxy the economic return to capital. Solomon [23], Stauffer
[24], and others have shown that "two companies with similar DCF rates
may well show widely differing book rates of return" [23, p. 78]. The
size and direction of the discrepancy between accounting and economic
rates of return can be an extremely complicated function of the economic
life of investment projects, the rate of growth of the capital budget,
depreciation and capitalization poilicies, the time configuration of
cash flows, and other factors.
A final drawback to the CE approach is that it is backward looking
while equity investors required return is based upon anticipated divi-
dends and capital gains relative to stock price. Required return is an
opportunity cost reflecting the risk adjusted rate of return on an in-
cremental investment in the best alternative. The return on book equity
is not forward looking. Neither is it incremental which means an aver-
age rather than marginal return on investment will be used to estimate
a just and reasonable return. As long as the industry supply curve is
upward sloping, the average return on investment in the industry will
exceed the marginal return on investment. Thus the CE method does not
foster the same marginal conditions that exist under conditions of com-
petition. A necessary condition for allocative efficiency is that the
marginal return on new investment equal the marginal cost of capital.
If utility firms are permitted to earn the CE estimate on all investment.

-9-
then utility firms would be encouraged to undertake excessive investment
and would earn a higher return on new investment than is earned on incre-
mental investment by comparable firms in unregulated industries [8, p. 356].
Regulatory proceedings reveal the CE, DCF, and CAPM models coexist more
as rival rather than complementary approaches to estimating equity capital
cost. An assumption of stock market equilibrium implies the DCF and CAPM
models should provide comparable estimates of equity capital cost. Because
the CE method generates a measure of the average rather than the marginal
returns on investment, R would be expected to exceed DCF and CAPM esti-
' cec ^
mates. That is, R will provide an estimate for the pre-regulation r in
Figure 1 while E(R.) and ke provide estimates for the marginal cost of
equity capital. However, when the averaging of past data are used to esti-
mate R changes in the market and/or changes in growth opportunities may
cause E(R. ) and ke to be greater than the average R . The observable
association between R , E(r.) and ke will depend importantly upon whether
book rates on past investments somehow proxy investor's expected returns,
upon how accurately accounting rates reflect economic rates on book equity,
upon the slope of utility lOS curves, and upon the set of firms determined
to have corresponding risks. Whether R can provide a useful, corrobor-
ative estimate of equity capital costs is a question to be answered empiri-
cally .
CE-DCF-CAPM REQUIRED RETURN ESTIMATION:
DATA AM) METHODS
Equity capital cost measures for single firms are subject to measurement
errors and biases. A partial solution to this measurement difficulty for pur-
poses of rate regulation is to broaden the sample to a set of "equivalent risk
firms" and estimate a plausible "zone of confidence" for the equity cost of
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the average firm in the set. But this requires an operational definition of
"equivalent risk."
While there is no consensus as to how to identify "sets of equivalent-
risk firms," Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes [2], Beaver and Manegold [3],
Gonedes [12], and Ball and Brown [1], have found systematic associations be-
tween various accounting measures and the H market measure of risk. Bowman
[5] has developed a theoretical linkage between accounting betas and the
market beta measure of risk. These studies suggest that accounting betas
can provide objective measures for assessing the risk comparability between
(utilities and nonregulated) firms. This study utilizes several alterna-
tive accounting beta measures to identify sets of equivalent risk non-
regulated firms (based on accounting earnings) needed to assess the com-
parability of the CE, DCF, and CAPM equity cost estimates for utilities.
Estimates of R , E(R.), and ke are developed for year end 197b
for the 30 of the 35 S&P utility index firms for which Compustat data
were available for the 1957-1976 period. While it is likely that utili-
ties have comparable risks, basing the return allowed upon the returns
experienced by utilities in the past does not satisfy the Hope decision's
criteria of "commensurate returns on investments in other enterprises of
corresponding risks." Limiting the reference set of comparable firms to
those in the same regulated industry can cause regulation to become a
circular process. This circularity issue is most apparent with the CE
approach. But it is also relevant for the two market models which use
historical data to proxy expectations. Historical industry return data
may embody eposodic and/or regulatory induced adjustments that can bias
the E(R.) and ke estimates [6, 11]. For this reason a sample of non-regu-
lated firms of corresponding risk is needed to meet the Hope decision's
comparable earnings and capital attraction standards.
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Seven sets of non-regxilated firms with characteristics comparable
to the S&P index utilities are constructed. Each set is of size 60 and
is selected from the 208 firms of the S&P A25 which have Compustat data
available for the 1957-1976 period and which have a December fiscal year,
The sets are formed and the variables are calculated as of year end 1976,
Four of the seven sets are formed using accounting betas based upon:
(1) earnings per share; (2) change in earnings per share; (3) the earn-
ings per share /price per share
^
; and (4) book return /common equity
capital
^
. Accounting beta measures are calculated using 20 years of
annual data. The market index for each measure is the 208 firm average.
Two other sets of non-regulated firms are formed using market beta
measures: one is based on the holding period returns of the 208 firms
and the other based on the Fisher Index. The final set was constructed
using a measure designed to identify capital intensive firms
5 5
[ Z Depreciation / E Earnings Before Interest and Taxes]. The market
t=l ^ t=l
beta or holding period return set of firms was included because it in-
cludes non-regulated firms that provided comparable returns after the
fact. It may be that "the fairness of the rate of return to equity
holders [of utilities] can only be judged retrospectively [22, p. 702]."
The last set of firms was selected to see if capital intensive firms dis-
play similar equity capital cost measures.
The 60 firm sets of comparable firms were formed by ranking the
208 industrial firms on each measure, and then selecting the 30 firms
on either side of the mean value of the 30 utility firms. Estimates of
R , ECR.), and ke are then developed for the seven 60 firm sets.
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Estimates of ke for the utility set and the 7 sets of non-regulated
firms were derived following the Federal Power Commission's Office of
Economics DCF model
DPSS
ke =
^
^ + SGEPS (3)
J jt
where DPSS = exponentially smoothed (5 years) dividends per share
for firm j in year t;
P = price per share for firm j at end of year t; and
SGEPS = exponentially smoothed (5 years) growth rate of
earnings per share for firm j in year t.
The details of the exponential smoothing procedure are presented in [9]
and [10].
CAPM equity cost estimates are calculated following equation (4)
E(R.^) = R^^ + 3., (R^^ - R^^) • (4)
where R^ = market yield on one year U.S. Treasury Bills as of
t December of year t;
R^ - R-p, = risk premia on the market portfolio; and
e = cov (R R^ )/var (R^ )
where R and R^ are five years of monthly holding
period returns (ending in December of year t) for
security j and the Fisher Index.
Ibbotson and Sinquefield's [14] risk premia data show the risk premium
on common stock averaged 8.17 percent in the 1926-1966 period, 6.68 per-
cent in the 1926-1976 period, and 9.90 percent in the 1952-1966 period.
An annualized monthly risk premia of 10 percent is used to calculate
E(R ) in 1966 and 1976.
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R is calculated by relating the earnings available to common
equity capital in year t to equity book value in year (t-1) . Annual hold-
ing period returns (HPR) were also calculated.
The data required for calculating R , ke, and E(R.) were obtained
for the 1957-1976 period from the Compustat and CRSP tapes, and the
Federal Reserve Bulletin .
COMPARABILITY OF THE R , ke, and E(R.) MEASURES
cec J
A two stage analysis was utilized to examine the comparability of
the R , ke, and E(R.) measures of required return on equity. The first
stage examines the relationships which exist (if any) among the three
cost of equity measures for the seven groups of non-regulated firms with
comparable earnings betas. The second stage of the analysis compares the
cost of equity capital measures of the thirty S&P index utilities with
those of the seven sets of comparable industrial firms as suggested by
Myers [18].
The methods used in forming the seven sets of comparable firms, four
accounting beta sets, two market risk sets, and a set of firms of com-
parable capital intensiveness, were discussed earlier. After the groups
were formed, the three equity cost measures, the actual holding period
return (HPR) , and the market betas for the 60 industrial firm portfolios
4
were calculated. The results for the 1957-1976 period are presented
in Table 1.
Table 1 about here
Several observations can be made. First, the estimates of E(R.)
and R are more stable than the estimate for ke across the alternative
cec

TABLE 1
EQUITY CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES AM) HOLDING PERIOD
RETURN FOR THE 30 UTILITIES AND ALTERNATIVE
SETS OF 60 INDUSTRIALS: 1957-1966
Sample Equity Capital Cost
Holding
Period
Return
Market
Firms E(Rj) ke R
cec
Beta
30 Electric Utilities .126
(.018)
.132
(.039)
.085
(.011)
-.004
(.023)
.796
(.177)
Sets of 60 Industrials
^EPS^ .161
(.031)
.162
(.245)
.155
(.069)
.025
(.089)
1.144
(.313)
^EPS /P .154
(.033)
.229
(.237)
.161
(.063)
.058
(.105)
1.077
(.332)
^AEPS^/EPS^_^ .154
(.030)
.104
(.469)
.129
(.050)
.083
(.114)
1.077
(.301)
^HPR:208 .150
(.021)
.227
(.260)
.163
(.066)
.084
(.096)
1.033
(.207)
^R
cec
.146
(.029)
.155
(.795)
.148
(.065)
.075
(.095)
1.064
(.100)
Depr/EBIT^ .160
(.030)
.241
(.445)
.146
(.051)
.049
(.097)
1.131
(.305)
^rket .125(.093)
.209
(.277)
.147
(.062)
.089
(.095)
.788
(.093)
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sets of industrials. E(R.) varies from 12.5% to 16.1% while R varies
2 cec
from 12.9% to 16.3%. However, high (low) estimates using the E(R.) model
did not occur with the same sets of industrials as the high (low) esti-
mates of R . Also, the standard deviation of the E(R.) estimate was
cec ' 2
consistently less than for the R estimate (except when the groups
were formed using a market beta) . Second, the ke measure varied greatly
from set-to-set; going from a low of 10.4% when the change in EPS was
used for grouping, to a high of 22.9% when the E/P ratio was used. Fur-
thermore, the standard deviation of the ke estimate was much greater than
for either of the other measures. This variation was caused by the highly
variable growth factor for industrial firms in the ke calculation. Fin-
ally, the market betas for all of the groups based on comparable earn-
ings considerations were greater than 1.0, indicating systematic risk was
similar to or greater than the market.
The correlations among the cost of equity measures, among the ac-
counting beta measures, and between the cost of equity measures and the
accounting beta measures for the 208 industrials are presented in Table 2.
As can be seen, there were no significant associations among the cost of
equity measures, E(R.), R , and ke. This finding indicates that even
when a group of unregulated firms with corresponding risk characteristics
is selected, the three measures of the cost of equity capital may not be
similar. An examination of the utility results revealed similar results.
Table 2 about here
There were, however, significant associations among the accounting
beta measures and between the accounting betas and the equity cost measures,
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For example, the EPS accounting beta exhibited significant negative re-
lationships with the HPR:208 beta and with the E(R.) cost of equity esti-
mate. It exhibited significant positive relationships with the E/P beta,
the capital intensive Depr/EBIT ratio, and the ke cost of equity estimate.
Besides examining the alternative equity cost estimates, HPR and
market beta for each of the seven sets of 60 industrials, the make-up of
the seven groups was also examined. That is, of the 60 firms which were
included in the EPS beta group, how many of these were also included in
the E/P ratio beta group, the AEPS/EPS beta group, etc. Because of the
differing relationship among the accounting betas, it is expected that
the sets of 60 industrials will show a good deal of variation in the
firms selected for each set. Table 3 provides this information. The
number of firms included in any two groups ranges from a high of 23 firms
(38.3%) included in the HPR: 208 beta and R beta groups to a low of 11
firms (18.3%) for the AEPS/EPS beta and Depr/EBIT beta groups and for the
EPS beta and market beta groups. The average group overlap was 17 firms..
Stated differently, for any two-group comparison, forty-three of the
firms in any 60 firm set was not included in the other set. This rela-
tively low amount of group overlap is one source of the variation in the
equity cost estimates.
Table 3 about here
Summarizing, the first stage of the empirical analysis revealed:
(1) the E(R.) and R are much more consistent than the ke estimates
J cec
across the seven groups of 60 firms; (2) the market betas (for the 60
firm groups based on accounting betas) are all greater than 1.0;

TABLE 3
COMMON GROUP MEMBERSHIP IN THE SEVEN
SETS OF 60 INDUSTRIAL FIRMS
EPS. 6EPS^/P
AEPS
t' t-1 EPS
— ^HPR:208 ^R
t-1
Depr,
cec EBIT
mkt
EPS.
60
EPS^/P^_^ 15 60
^AEPSj./EPS ^^ 12 60
e.HPR:208 17 21 18 60
cec.
18 22 20 23 60
Depr^/EBIT^
^mkt
17
11
20
19
11
15
15
18
22
16
60
14 60
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(3) there is no significant correlation among the equity cost estimates;
(4) several of the accounting betas were significantly correlated with
the equity cost measures; and (5) the 60 firms in the alternative groups
varied greatly from group-to-group.
The second stage of the study involved a comparison of the equity
cost measures, the HPR and the market beta for the 30 utilities with the
same measures for the alternative groups formed on accounting betas.
These results are shown at the top of Table 1. As can be seen, the E(R.)
for the 30 utilities is from 2% to 3.5% lower than for any of the indus-
trial groups. On the one hand this difference is not surprising. The
discrepancy can be explained by the difference between the average mar-
ket beta for the 30 utilities of .796 versus 1.0+ average beta for the
industrial firm sets. On the other hand, this difference is surprising
since the industrial firm sets were constructed using accounting beta
risk measures to insure only firms with risks comparable to utilities
would be selected.
The cost of equity estimate for the 30 utilities using the ke mea-
sure was 13.2% with a standard deviation of 3.9%. The mean for the
utilities is substantially lower than the mean ke for all but one of
the sets of industrial firms. Also the standard deviation of the util-
ities ke measure is less than 1/6 the standard deviation of any of the
industrial groups. Even though the utilities have accounting betas
similar to the groups of industrials, the ke distribution for the util-
ities is much less dispersed than the industrial groups.
The five year geometric return on book equity for the utilities
was less than any of the alternative industrial groups. The R for

-17-
the 30 utilities averaged 8.5% while the R 's for the industrials" cec
ranged from a low of 12.9% to a high of 16.3%.
As noted earlier, the market beta for the 60 firm sets are substan-
tially higher than the market beta for the 30 utilities. Thus, even
when the accounting earnings were comparable, by whatever measure, the
market betas indicated the utilities e^chibited substantially less
systematic risk than the 60 industrials.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Regulatory rate hearings reveal the three common approaches to esti-
mating equity capital costs, the CE, CAPM, and DCF models, coexist more
as rival rather than complementary techniques. It has been the purpose
of this paper to reconcile these three approaches to public utility rate
regulation.
Two of the three estimating procedures, ke and E(R.), were shown to
confoirm with the notion of a just and reasonable return from both a legal
and economic vantage point. A comparison of R measures with ke and
ECR.) revealed R has serious shortcoming as a measure of equity capi-
tal cost. R is not an opportunity cost construct but rather is an
average (book) return on past (book) investments. Also, there is no
theory about the relationship of risk and average book rates of return.
Despite these shortcomings, R is used as a measure of equity
capital costs by financial experts witnesses in rate hearings. A R
estimate is generally non-replicable because it is the mean return on
book equity for a set of firms the expert judges to have corresponding
risks. Accounting beta and market beta measures were used in this paper
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to identify sets of industrial firms with comparable risks and, thereby,
introduce replicability into the CE methodology. The seven sets of
industrial firms were structured to have a size of 60 firms and median
accounting/market betas equal to the corresponding beta measures for
the 30 utility sample. Estimates of E(R.), ke, and R were calculated
J cec
for the seven industrial sets and the utility groups for 1976.
It was found that the R and E(R.) measures were somewhat similar
cec 2
in magnitude for the sets of industrial firms. The ke measure for in-
dustrials displayed a much wider dispersion than utilities on both a
within and between sets basis due to the impact of earnings variability
on the growth component of ke. The equity capital cost measures for the
utility sample were substantially lower than for the sets of industrial
firnis with comparable risks as measured by accounting and market betas.
An explanation for this is that despite accounting beta comparability,
the market measure of risk (3 , ) revals the industrial sets have
market'
portfolio betas of approximately 1.1 while the utility portfolio beta
is only .8. Specification of sets of corresponding risk firms might
better be handled by first identifying industrial firms with market
betas similar to utilities, and then selecting sets of firms with com-
parable accounting earnings characteristics.
It is hoped that this initial effort to reconcile the three common
approaches to estimating equity cost in rate hearings will stimulate
further research that will ultimately resolve the conflicts associated
with rate of return hearings.

FOOTNOTES
F.P.C. V. Hope Natural Gas Company, 320 U.S. 591 (1949) at b03.
2
Once investors' expectations about investment opportunities of-
fering returns greater than ke became capitalized in the share price,
then expected project returns greater than ke must be realized by the
firm if investors are, in fact, to achieve their required ke return on
the current share price.
3
According to the National Association of Regulatory and Utility
Commissioners [21, p. 432], more than half of the state commissions rely
upon or accept the CE method of determining the cost of equity capital.
4
The HPR and R measures for 1976 are geometric means of the
five year period 19/2-1976.
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